Color Relationalism, Ordinary Illusion, and Color Incompatibility

Philosophia 42 (4):1085-1097 (2014)
Pendaran Roberts
University of Manchester
Relationalism is a view popularized by Cohen according to which the colors are relational properties. Cohen’s view has the unintuitive consequence that the following propositions are false: (i) no object can be more than one determinate or determinable color all over at the same time; (ii) ordinary illusion cases occur whenever the color perceptually represented conflicts, according to (i) above, with the object’s real color; and (iii) the colors we perceive obey (i). I investigate Cohen’s attempt to address these intuitive propositions with which his view struggles and find it to be incompatible with how he motivates his view.
Keywords Color  Relationalism  Ordinary illusion  Color incompatibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9548-4
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Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.

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