Counterfactual Triviality

Abstract
I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual Ramsey Test makes counterfactuals subject to the very argument that Lewis used to argue against the indicative version of the Ramsey Test. I compare the assumptions needed to run each, pointing to assumptions about the time-evolution of chances that can replace the appeal to Bayesian assumptions about credence update in motivating the assumptions of the argument.I finish by outlining two reactions to the discussion: to indicativize the debate on counterfactuals; or to counterfactualize the debate on indicatives
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr201285375
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,385
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Chancy Counterfactuals, Redux.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):352-361.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.J. Robert & G. Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
The Ramsey Test and Conditional Semantics.Frank Döring - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):359-376.
A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.
A Defence of the Ramsey Test.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):1-21.
Ramsey + Moore ≠ God.David Barnett - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):168 - 174.
Added to PP index
2013-07-22

Total downloads
58 ( #101,108 of 2,225,946 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #250,407 of 2,225,946 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature