Good intentions and a great divide: Having babies by intending them [Book Review]

Law and Philosophy 12 (3):287 - 317 (1993)
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Abstract

Thus, there is a compelling policy argument as well as a suggestive constitutional argument that the practice of selling parental rights in general, and in particular the practice of commercial surrogacy, should not be permitted. These arguments favor the approach adopted in New York State as opposed to any more latitudinarian approach that would permit commercial surrogacy. Clearly, if the payment of money in exchange for parental rights should be prohibited, then we have a strong basis on which to reject the intentionalist theory, along with any other theory tht would link the parentage of a child with the payment of money. This conclusion is in no way undermined by the various arguments recited in part V above that favor the intentionalist theory since, as we have seen, these arguments are flawed

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Melinda A. Roberts
The College of New Jersey

Citations of this work

The moral complexity of sperm donation.Rivka Weinberg - 2008 - Bioethics 22 (3):166–178.
Human Cloning: A Case of no Harm Done?M. A. Roberts - 1996 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 21 (5):537-554.
A Way of Looking at the Dalla Corte Case.Melinda A. Roberts - 1994 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 22 (4):339-342.

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