Intrinsic qualities of experience: Surviving Harman's critique [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309 (1998)
Gilbert Harman (1990) seeks to defend psychophysical functionalism by articulating a representationalist view of the qualities of experience. The negative side of the present paper argues that the resources of this representationalist view are insufficient to ground the evident distinction between perception and (mere) thought. This failure makes the view unable to support the uses to which Harman wishes to put it. Several rescuing moves by other representationalists are considered, but none is found successful. Part of the difficulty in Harman's (...) work is that he does not adequately specify the view he rejects. The positive aim of the present paper is to provide a robust intrinsic quality account of experience that offers advantages in comparison with Harman's view, and that plainly does not fall to any of the arguments he advances
Keywords Experience  Functionalism  Intrinsic  Metaphysics  Perception  Quality  Representationalism  Thought  Harman, G
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005339601814
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