Theory and Decision 55 (1):1-44 (2003)

Authors
Melinda A. Roberts
The College of New Jersey
Abstract
This article critically examines some of the inconsistency objections that have been put forward by John Broome, Larry Temkin and others against the so-called "person-affecting," or "person-based," restriction in normative ethics, including "extra people" problems and a version of the nonidentity problem from Kavka and Parfit. Certain Pareto principles and a version of the "mere addition paradox" are discussed along the way. The inconsistencies at issue can be avoided, it is argued, by situating the person-affecting intuition within a non-additive form of maximizing consequentialism – a theory which then competes with such additive, or aggregative, forms of maximizing consequentialism as "totalism" and "averagism.".
Keywords Economics / Management Science   Economics/Management Science, general   Operation Research/Decision Theory   Methodology of the Social Sciences
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/B:THEO.0000019052.80871.b3
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A Consequentialist Account of Narveson’s Dictum.John Cusbert & Robyn Kath - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1693-1709.

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