Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection

Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):129-143 (2004)

Authors
Philip Robbins
University of Missouri, Columbia
Abstract
Does the ability to know one's own mind depend on the ability to know the minds of others? According to the 'theory theory' of first-person mentalizing, the answer is yes. Recent alternative accounts of this ability, such as the 'monitoring theory', suggest otherwise. Focusing on the issue of introspective access to propositional attitudes, I argue that a better account of first-person mentalizing can be devised by combining these two theories. After sketching a hybrid account, I show how it can do justice to competing intuitions about the nature of introspective self-awareness. I close by drawing some methodological morals about the study of mentalizing and the role of introspective evidence in cognitive science.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,219
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Ins and Outs of Introspection.Philip Robbins - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.
Introspection, Mindreading, and the Transparency of Belief.Uwe Peters - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1086-1102.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection.Philip Robbins - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):129-143.
The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate.Monika Dullstein - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):231-248.
The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
Knowing-That, Knowing-How, and Knowing Philosophically.Stephen Hetherington - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):307-324.
Introspection and Consciousness.Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286.
On Knowing One's Own Language.Barry C. Smith - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 391--428.
Deep, Dark…or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires.Lauren Ashwell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-02-21

Total views
0

Recent downloads (6 months)
0

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes