Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):129-143 (2004)

Authors
Philip Robbins
University of Missouri, Columbia
Abstract
Does the ability to know one's own mind depend on the ability to know the minds of others? According to the 'theory theory' of first-person mentalizing, the answer is yes. Recent alternative accounts of this ability, such as the 'monitoring theory', suggest otherwise. Focusing on the issue of introspective access to propositional attitudes , I argue that a better account of first-person mentalizing can be devised by combining these two theories. After sketching a hybrid account, I show how it can do justice to competing intuitions about the nature of introspective self-awareness. I close by drawing some methodological morals about the study of mentalizing and the role of introspective evidence in cognitive science
Keywords Introspection  Knowing  Mind
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On the Possibility and Reality of Introspection.Michel Bitbol & Claire Petitmengin - 2013 - Kairos. Revista de Filosofia and Ciência 6:173-198.
The Ins and Outs of Introspection.Philip Robbins - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.
Introspection, Mindreading, and the Transparency of Belief.Uwe Peters - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1086-1102.

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