Not So Enticing Reasons

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):263-277 (2008)

Authors
Simon Robertson
Cardiff University
Abstract
A common view of the relation between oughts and reasons is that you ought to do something if and only if that is what you have most reason to do. One challenge to this comes from what Jonathan Dancy calls ‘enticing reasons.’ Dancy argues that enticing reasons never contribute to oughts and that it is false that if the only reasons in play are enticing reasons then you ought to do what you have most reason to do. After explaining how enticing reasons supposedly work and why accepting them may appear attractive, I firstly show why we are not committed to accepting them into our conceptual framework and then argue that no reasons work in the way enticing reasons are claimed to. Thus we should reject the category of enticing reasons entirely.
Keywords Philosophy   Ontology   Political Philosophy   Ethics
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-007-9091-5
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.

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Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?Daniel Whiting - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):535-555.

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