Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions

Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34 (2014)

Authors
Luke Robinson
Southern Methodist University
Abstract
Moral obligations rest on circumstances. But what are these obligating reasons and in virtue of what are they such reasons? Nomological conceptions define such reasons in terms of moral laws. I argue that one such conception cannot be correct and that others do not support the familiar and plausible view that obligating reasons are pro tanto reasons, either because they entail that this view is false or else because they cannot explain—or even help to explain—how it could be true. I also argue that a particular dispositional conception of obligating reasons does support this view of obligating reasons by enabling an explanation of how it could be true. Moreover, my arguments show that the dispositional moral metaphysic on which this conception is predicated can do something that nomological alternatives cannot: explain why obligating reasons and moral obligations are pro tanto reasons and obligations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1163/17455243-4681025
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,836
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Ethics of ‘Gun-Free Zones’.Timothy Hsiao - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):659-676.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws.Luke Robinson - 2007 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-22.
Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments.Eric Vogelstein - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.
Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice.Brendan Larvor - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
Pro-Tanto Obligations and Ceteris-Paribus Rules.Danny Frederick - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons.Marion Hourdequin - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
Particularism and Default Reasons.Pekka Väyrynen - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):53-79.
Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'.Patricia Greenspan - 2007 - In Russell Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. Clarendon Press. pp. 172-194.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-11-18

Total views
104 ( #77,064 of 2,266,095 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #357,700 of 2,266,095 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature