Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions

Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral obligations rest on circumstances. But what are these obligating reasons and in virtue of what are they such reasons? Nomological conceptions define such reasons in terms of moral laws. I argue that one such conception cannot be correct and that others do not support the familiar and plausible view that obligating reasons are pro tanto reasons, either because they entail that this view is false or else because they cannot explain—or even help to explain—how it could be true. I also argue that a particular dispositional conception of obligating reasons does support this view of obligating reasons by enabling an explanation of how it could be true. Moreover, my arguments show that the dispositional moral metaphysic on which this conception is predicated can do something that nomological alternatives cannot: explain why obligating reasons and moral obligations are pro tanto reasons and obligations.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,659

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws.Luke Robinson - 2007 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-22.
Moral Laws, Laws of Nature and Dispositions.Danny Frederick - 2014 - Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):303-14.
Pro-tanto Obligations and Ceteris-paribus Rules.Danny Frederick - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity.Benjamin Sachs - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):703-716.
Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-11-18

Downloads
167 (#118,525)

6 months
20 (#173,249)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luke Robinson
Southern Methodist University

References found in this work

How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
‘Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad’.Brad Hooker - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-22.
Dispositions.John Heil - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):343-356.
Four Disputes About Properties.David M. Armstrong - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
Reasoning with moral conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.

View all 8 references / Add more references