On time, memory and dynamic form

Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):762-788 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A common approach to explaining the perception of form is through the use of static features. The weakness of this approach points naturally to dynamic definitions of form. Considering dynamical form, however, leads inevitably to the need to explain how events are perceived as time-extended—a problem with primacy over that even of qualia. Optic flow models, energy models, models reliant on a rigidity constraint are examined. The reliance of these models on the instantaneous specification of form at an instant, t, or across a series of such instants forces the consideration of the primary memory supporting both the perception of time-extended events and the time-extension of consciousness. This cannot be reduced to an integration over space and time. The difficulty of defining the basis for this memory is highlighted in considerations of dynamic form in relation to scales of time. Ultimately, the possibility is raised that psychology must follow physics in a more profound approach to time and motion

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
48 (#291,653)

6 months
4 (#315,466)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Functional kinds: a skeptical look.Cameron Buckner - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3915-3942.
Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration.Matyáš Moravec - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3):197-224.
Semantic redintegration: Ecological invariance.Stephen E. Robbins - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):726-727.
Bergson and the holographic theory of mind.Stephen E. Robbins - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):365-394.
The cost of explicit memory.Stephen E. Robbins - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):33-66.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Matter and Memory.Henri Bergson - 1912 - Mineola, N.Y.: MIT Press. Edited by Paul, Nancy Margaret, [From Old Catalog], Palmer & William Scott.
The kinetic depth effect.Hans Wallach & D. N. O'Connell - 1953 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 45 (4):205.
Dynamic mental representations.Jennifer J. Freyd - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (4):427-438.

View all 11 references / Add more references