Reasons and motivation: not a wrong distinction

Abstract

This paper responds to Susan Hurley's attempt to undermine the adequacy of the distinction at the heart of the internalism-externalism debate about reasons for action. The paper shows that Hurley's argument fails and then, more positively, indicates a neat way to characterize the distinction.

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Simon Robertson
Cardiff University

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