Philosophy Compass 8 (8):677-688 (2013)
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In ethics, aesthetics and increasingly in epistemology, a distinction is drawn between thick and thin evaluative concepts. A common characterisation of the distinction is that thin concepts have only evaluative content, whereas thick concepts combine evaluative and descriptive content. Because of this combination, it is again commonly thought that thick concepts have various distinctive powers including the power to undermine the distinction between fact and value. This paper discusses the accuracy of this view of the thick concepts debate, as well as assessing the prospects for a thick concepts argument against the fact value distinction, while introducing the three main philosophical positions on the nature of thick concepts
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DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12055 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Language of Morals. (Reprinted From Corrected Sheets.).Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford Clarendon Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.
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Citations of this work BETA
Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?Anna Alexandrova - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):421-445.
The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections.Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1122-1145.
Ardent Realism Without Referential Normativity.Tristram McPherson - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):489-508.
View all 29 citations / Add more citations
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