Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94 (1997)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used in different senses in the principles. In (1) and (3), 'properties' should be read as 'tropes' (properties here are particulars), while in (2) 'properties' should read as 'types' (properties here are universals or classes). Although mental types are distinct from physical types, every mental trope is a physical trope. This allows mental properties to be causally relevant to physical effects without violating the closed character of the physical world.
|
Keywords | Causation Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Mental Property |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00054 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
View all 35 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Non-Reductive Realization and the Powers-Based Subset Strategy.Jessica M. Wilson - 2011 - The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.
View all 49 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):149 - 172.
Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice.Tyler Burge - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties.S. C. Gibb - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.
Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation.Robert Buckley - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Van Gulick’s Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited.Janez Bregant - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
237 ( #46,847 of 2,506,032 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #102,822 of 2,506,032 )
2009-01-28
Total views
237 ( #46,847 of 2,506,032 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #102,822 of 2,506,032 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads