The supreme emergency exemption: Rawls and the use of force

European Journal of Political Theory 11 (2):155-171 (2012)
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Abstract

Both Rawls and Walzer argue for a supreme emergency exemption and are commonly thought to do so for the same reasons. However, far from ‘aping’ Walzer, Rawls engages in a reconstruction of the exemption that changes its focus altogether, making clear its dependence on an account of universal human rights and the idea of a well-ordered society. This paper is therefore, in the first instance, textual, demonstrating that Rawls has been misinterpreted in the case of supreme emergency. In the second instance the approach is reconstructive, providing a reinterpretation of Rawls that fits his treatment of supreme emergency with his broader commitments in just war and international relations. This reinterpretation enables us to draw out a pattern of argument that Rawls appears to share with a much more strident liberal cosmopolitanism

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Citations of this work

Rawls on International Economic Justice in The Law of Peoples.Rex Martin - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 127 (4):743-759.
‘Supreme Emergencies’, ontological holism, and rights to communal membership.J. Toby Reiner - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (4):425-445.
‘Supreme Emergencies’, ontological holism, and rights to communal membership.J. Toby Reiner - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (4):425-445.

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