Synthese 139 (1):55-80 (2004)

Authors
Philip Robbins
University of Missouri, Columbia
Abstract
Some accounts of mental content represent the objects of belief as structured, using entities that formally resemble the sentences used to express and report attitudes in natural language; others adopt a relatively unstructured approach, typically using sets or functions. Currently popular variants of the latter include classical and neo-classical propositionalism, which represent belief contents as sets of possible worlds and sets of centered possible worlds, respectively; and property self-ascriptionism, which employs sets of possible individuals. I argue against their contemporary proponents that all three views are ineluctably plagued by generation gaps: they either overgenerate beliefs, undergenerate them, or both
Keywords Belief  Content  Metaphysics  Possible World  Propositional Attitudes  Structure
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DOI 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000021308.22619.83
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Problems in Epistemic Space.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):153-170.
Logic for Morals, Morals From Logic.Charlie Kurth - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):161-180.

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