Authors
José M. Méndez
Universidad de Salamanca
Gemma Robles
Universidad de León
Abstract
Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing specialconstraints on F. RelationaI ternary semantics are provided.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI theoria200520214
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References found in this work BETA

A Routley-Meyer Semantics for Converse Ackermann Property.José M. Méndez - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (1):65 - 76.
Normal Modal Substructural Logics with Strong Negation.Norihiro Kamide - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (6):589-612.

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