Thoughts without distinctive non-imagistic phenomenology

Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think that p, and a different non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think that q. Nor need we suppose that there is a proprietary 'what it is like' to have one propositional attitude type rather than another
Keywords Image  Metaphysics  Phenomenology  Propositional Attitudes  Theory  Thinking
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00414.x
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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Citations of this work BETA
R. HuRlburt & S. Akhter (2008). Unsymbolized Thinking. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1364-1374.
Marta Jorba (2015). Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):730-753.

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