Authors
John Roberts
Florida State University
Abstract
Draft version of essay. ABSTRACT: Benjamin Whichcote developed a distinctive account of human nature centered on our moral psychology. He believed that this view of human nature, which forms the foundation of “Cambridge Platonism,” showed that the demands of reason and faith are not merely compatible but dynamically supportive of one another. I develop an interpretation of this oft-neglected and widely misunderstood account of human nature and defend its viability against a key objection.
Keywords Cambridge Platonism  moral psychology  Human Nature  Ralph Cudworth  Henry More  John Smith  modal voluntarism  divine command  Image of God  Neoplatonism
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DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659593.003.0002
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