Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge

Noûs 45 (1):22-49 (2011)
The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge
Keywords Conceivability  De Re Modality
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00757.x
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
What's Wrong with Strong Necessities?Philip Goff & David Papineau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):749-762.
Thought Experiments Without Possible Worlds.Daniel Dohrn - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):605-623.

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