Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):185-193 (2011)

William Roche
Texas Christian University
If a subject’s belief system is inconsistent, does it follow that the subject’s beliefs (all of them) are unjustified? It seems not. But, coherentist theories of justification (at least some of them) imply otherwise, and so, it seems, are open to counterexample. This is the “Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs”.  I examine two main versions of the Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs, and argue that coherentists can give at least a promising line of response to each of them.
Keywords Coherentism  Inconsistency  Justification  Problem of Justified Inconsistenct Beliefs
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Reprint years 2012
ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview201127120
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References found in this work BETA

``Justified Inconsistent Beliefs".Richard Foley - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247-257.
Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
Coherence and the Modularity of Mind.Erik J. Olsson - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):404-11.

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