Coherentism, truth, and witness agreement

Acta Analytica 25 (2):243-257 (2010)
Abstract
Coherentists on epistemic justification claim that all justification is inferential, and that beliefs, when justified, get their justification together (not in isolation) as members of a coherent belief system. Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “individual credibility” is needed for “witness agreement” to increase the probability of truth and generate a high probability of truth. It can seem that, from this result in formal epistemology, it follows that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive, that it is not the case that, under the requisite conditions, coherentist justification increases the probability of truth and generates a high probability of truth. I argue that this does not follow.
Keywords Coherentism  Individual credibility  Justification  Truth-conduciveness  Witness agreement
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0065-1
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
Evidentialism.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
``What is Justified Belief?".Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.William Roche - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Does Justification Aim at Truth?Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.
Coherence as a Test for Truth.Robert Stern - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):296–326.
The Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification.T. Shogenji - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):90 – 106.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-11-11

Total downloads

144 ( #30,836 of 2,146,217 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #75,470 of 2,146,217 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums