Extended cognition and intrinsic properties

Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):741-757 (2010)
Abstract
The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) has been criticized as committing what is called the coupling?constitution fallacy, but it is the critic's use of this concept which is fallacious. It is true that there is no reason to deny that the line between the self and the world should be drawn at the skull and/or the skin. But the data used to support HEC reveal that there was never a good enough reason to draw the line there in the first place. The burden of proof has fallen on the mind?brain identity theory, now that our intuitions/prejudices no longer support it. One of those ?intuitions? is the Aristotelian assumption that the world can be neatly divided into objects that possess intrinsic causal powers, and the causal relations that connect those objects. In modern science, however, the concept of intrinsic causal powers is only a temporary stopgap that makes it possible to begin research in a particular area. It therefore seems best to assume that the line between mind and world is both pragmatic and dynamic. Consequently, the mind might best described as a fluctuating field, rather than an object or structure
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2010.529044
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References found in this work BETA
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
Understanding The Embodiment of Perception.Kenneth Aizawa - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (1):5-25.

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Citations of this work BETA
Dimensions of Integration in Embedded and Extended Cognitive Systems.Richard Heersmink - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):577-598.
Distinguishing Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition.Kenneth Aizawa - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):91 - 106.

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