Explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant, or inference to the best explanation meets Bayesian confirmation theory

Analysis 73 (4):659-668 (2013)
Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison
In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ant079
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References found in this work BETA

Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic.Michael Huemer - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):345-375.
A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.Tomoji Shogenji - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):613-616.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Explanation Guides Confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):359-68.
Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent.Nevin Climenhaga - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (5):251-273.
Why Explanatoriness Is Evidentially Relevant.Kevin McCain & Ted Poston - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):145-153.

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