In Alex Sager & Angela Coventry (eds.), The Humean Mind. New York, NY, USA: pp. 124-136 (2019)

Authors
Stefanie Rocknak
Hartwick College
Abstract
Hume’s understanding of the external world, particularly, his conception of objects, or what he occasionally refers to as “bodies,” is the subject of much dispute. Are objects mind-independent? Or, are they just what we see, feel, smell, taste, or touch? In other words, are objects just sense data? Or, are they ideas about sense data? Or, are objects, somehow, mind-independent, but we have ideas of them, and we receive sense data from them? In this paper, I provide some answers to these questions—by way of distinguishing between the vulgar position, the philosophical position, and Hume’s position.
Keywords David Hume  external world  metaphysics  early modern  object  body  identity
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perceptions and Objects.Yumiko Inukai - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (2):189-210.
Three Questions About Treatise 1.4.2.Georges Dicker - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):115-153.
Hume on Sense Impressions and Objects.Marina Frasca-Spada - 2002 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 9:13-24.
More on Part IX of Hume's Dialogues.James Franklin - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (118):69-71.
Proof and Demonstration: Hume's Account of the Causal Relation.Andrew Ward - 2008 - International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):23-37.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-04-25

Total views
90 ( #102,415 of 2,331,046 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #15,909 of 2,331,046 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes