Authors
William Roche
Texas Christian University
Tomoji Shogenji
Rhode Island College
Abstract
This paper proposes a new interpretation of mutual information (MI). We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information (EVI) assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpretation is consistent with EVI, but it is faced with the problem of measure sensitivity and fails to justify the use of MI in giving definitive answers to questions of information. We propose a fourth interpretation of MI by reduction in expected inaccuracy, where inaccuracy is measured by a strictly proper monotonic scoring rule. It is shown that the answers to questions of information given by MI are definitive whenever this interpretation is appropriate, and that it is appropriate in a wide range of applications with epistemic implications.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axw025
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,241
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):577-604.
Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):189-213.
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
Can Planck's Constant Be Measured with Classical Mechanics?Hasok Chang - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (3):223 – 243.
The Inaccuracy Principle.Hans Martens & Willem M. de Muynck - 1990 - Foundations of Physics 20 (4):357-380.
Mental Representation From the Bottom Up.Dan Lloyd - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):23-78.
Dwindling Confirmation.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):114-137.
Three Kinds of ‘as-If’ Claims.Aki Lehtinen - 2013 - Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (2):184-205.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-05-16

Total views
8 ( #901,663 of 2,325,132 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #671,788 of 2,325,132 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes