Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):663-664 (2015)

David Rocheleau-Houle
Université Laval
Julia Markovits’ Moral Reason is a defense of internalism about moral reasons and a desire-based account of reasons for action. Even though she defends this position, she does not consider herself committed to relativism and to a desire-based understanding of what reasons there are. Indeed, it is crucial to make a distinction between two kinds of inquiry about reasons for action. On one side, we find “analytic inquiry” where the purpose is to define what reasons are. On the other, we find “substantive inquiry” where the purpose is to define what reasons there are (pp. 1–11). According to Markovits, a desire-based defense on the analytic side does not imply a desire-based defense on the substantive side.Internalism and externalism are the most prominent views about reasons for action. Markovits understands internalism as the theory according to which what reasons we have do depend fundamentally on what ends we already have. On the other hand, externalism is understood as the theory acco ..
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-014-9542-8
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