Mind-Independence and Modal Empiricism
Abstract
The paper focuses on the Epistemic Challenge for mind-independent accounts of modality. The challenge can be formulated as an inconsistency problem among three premises and, therefore, any strategy to meet the challenge will require the negation of (at least) one of its premises. The aim of the paper is not to offer a positive solution to the challenge, but rather to argue for the claim that to follow a hybrid strategy is probably the best way to meet it. With some qualifications, reasons are given as to why empiricism should be the way to meet the challenge as far as de re modality is concerned, whereas rationalism might be the correct way of addressing it for the case of de dicto modality.Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
The (a)(b)(c) of modal epistemology: A further attempt to meet the epistemic challenge.Sonia Roca - 2006
Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts and the Integration Challenge.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):335-361.
What's really wrong with constructive empiricism? Van Fraassen and the metaphysics of modality.James Ladyman - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):837-856.
Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism.Tuomas Tahko - 2017 - In Robert William Fischer & Felipe Leon (eds.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Synthese Library. pp. 29-45.
Constructive empiricism and modal metaphysics: A reply to Monton and Van Fraassen.James Ladyman - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):755-765.
Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism.Monton Bradley & Fraassen Bas C. Van - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405 - 422.
The relativist challenge to comparative philosophy.Ewing Chinn - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):451-466.
The acquisition of modality: Implications for theories of semantic representation.Anna Papafragou - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):370–399.
Analytics
Added to PP
2014-04-25
Downloads
57 (#209,605)
6 months
2 (#300,121)
2014-04-25
Downloads
57 (#209,605)
6 months
2 (#300,121)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Modal scepticism, Yablo-style conceivability, and analogical reasoning.Peter Hartl - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):269-291.
Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts and the Integration Challenge.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):335-361.
Structural Realism or Modal Empiricism?Quentin Ruyant - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1051-1072.
Theory Selection in Modal Epistemology.Robert William Fischer - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):381-395.
References found in this work
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.