On what the mind is identical with

Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):307-23 (1994)
Abstract
The unity of mind and body need not imply accepting the unity of mind and brain, because the mind-brain identity is something that science has presupposed, not discovered. I cite evidence from modern neuroscience that cognitive activities are distributed throughout the human nervous system, which challenges the 'scientific' assumption (believed by Descartes, among others) that the brain is the seat of the soul, and the rest of the nerves are mere message cables to the brain. Dennett comes close to accepting this point when he criticizes 'Cartesian materialism', and yet he still claims that Vie head is headquarters'. Accepting that the mind is the entire nervous system solves some philosophical problems, for Dennett and others. There is also some evidence that indicates that some cognitive activities may be hormonal rather than neural, which raises some challenging problems for the once obvious distinction between causing a mental state and embodying that state
Keywords Body  Brain  Cartesianism  Metaphysics  Mind
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DOI 10.1080/09515089408573126
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References found in this work BETA

Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.

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Extended Cognition and Intrinsic Properties.Teed Rockwell - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):741-757.

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