Probabilité et support inductif. Sur le thèoréme de Popper-Miller (1983)

Dialogue 43 (3):499-526 (2004)
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Abstract
In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is possible to conceptualize logically the idea of induction, it is shown that it is not possible on traditional Bayesian grounds.
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300003073
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