Two spheres, twenty spheres, and the identity of indiscernibles

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):480–492 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I argue that the standard counterexamples to the identity of indiscernibles fail because they involve a commitment to a certain kind of primitive or brute identity that has certain very unpalatable consequences involving the possibility of objects of the same kind completely overlapping and sharing all the same proper parts. The only way to avoid these consequences is to reject brute identity and thus to accept the identity of indiscernibles. I also show how the rejection of the identity of indiscernibles derives some of its support from its affinity with a Kripkean account of trans-world identity and theories of direct reference.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,429

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

373 (#29,528)

6 months
10 (#80,026)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Della Rocca
Yale University

Citations of this work

Explaining Identity and Distinctness.Erica Shumener - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2073-2096.
The Rise of Relationals.F. A. Muller - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):201-237.
Haecceitism.Sam Cowling - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Do Identity and Distinctness Facts Threaten the PSR?Erica Shumener - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1023-1041.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references