Witness agreement and the truth-conduciveness of coherentist justification

Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):151-169 (2012)
Authors
William Roche
Texas Christian University
Abstract
Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “witness agreement” by itself implies neither an increase in the probability of truth nor a high probability of truth—the witnesses need to have some “individual credibility.” It can seem that, from this formal epistemological result, it follows that coherentist justification (i.e., doxastic coherence) is not truth-conducive. I argue that this does not follow. Central to my argument is the thesis that, though coherentists deny that there can be noninferential justification, coherentists do not deny that there can be individual credibility
Keywords Coherentist justification  Individual credibility  Noninferential justification  Truth-conduciveness  Witness agreement
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00086.x
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.William Roche - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.
Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.
On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665.

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Explaining the Limits of Olsson's Impossibility Result.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):136-150.

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