Abstract

Do humans lack character? Or if they possess it, is it very different from what most people think it is? While it has long been held that character plays an indispensible role in moral theory, recent work from social psychologists suggests that there is no such thing as character, at least as humans have traditionally thought of it. Some have argued that programs of moral education couched in terms of global traits (like honesty) are to be jettisoned in favor of those couched in terms of local traits (like honesty-with-family). I take responding to these challenges to be the focus of my research. I argue that the empirical work actually reveals differences in character, not a lack of character. I then offer an account of moral improvement that respects the empirical data but remains faithful to the traditional account of character. My goals are to rescue the importance of character to ethics, to develop the beginnings of an empirically-informed program of moral education, and finally to explore the limits of our responsibility for our character in light of the psychological research. Just as one might begin on a path toward a healthier diet by a combination of brute resolve (setting one's will) and skilled resistance (setting up obstacles to satisfying pernicious desires), and empirical work can recommend the ways best to combat such desires, so can empirical work supplement a moral theory in order to produce a program of moral improvement. Thanks to the wealth of empirical work on these matters, our resources are considerable, but so is our culpability should we not try