(C) instances, the relevance criterion, and the paradoxes of confirmation

Philosophy of Science 45 (2):289-302 (1978)
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Abstract

The Relevance Criterion of confirmation gained prominence as the underlying principle of the class-size approach (CSA) to Hempel's paradoxes of confirmation. The CSA, however, yields counter-intuitive results for (c) instances, and this failing cast serious doubt on the acceptability of the Relevance Criterion. In this paper an attempt is made to rescue the Relevance Criterion from this embarrassment. This is done by incorporating that criterion into a new resolution of the paradoxes, a resolution based on a theory of selective confirmation and a distinction between mere confirmation in principle and evaluative confirmation (E-confirmation)

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Citations of this work

Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.
Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance.Robert T. Pennock - 2004 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-26.

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References found in this work

The paradox of confirmation.J. L. Mackie - 1962 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):265-277.
The paradox of confirmation.J. L. Mackie - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):265-276.
The paradoxes of confirmation - a survey.R. Swinburne - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):318 - 330.
The relevance criterion of confirmation.J. L. Mackie - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):27-40.
The paradoxes of confirmation.H. G. Alexander - 1958 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35):227-233.

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