Crença verdadeira mais informação adequada: Fortalecendo a visão de Foley


Authors
Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues
Federal University of Santa Maria
Abstract
Resumo: No livro When is Knowledge True Belief? (2012), Richard Foley apresenta uma teoria do conhecimento bastante simples e original, que pretende desbancar as rivais e reorientar a teoria do conhecimento: um sujeito S sabe alguma proposição p se e somente se S verdadeiramente crê que p e não lhe falta nenhuma informação importante. Michael Hannon, em seu artigo “Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information?” (2013), faz uma objeção à visão de Foley, acusando-o de oferecer um argumento circular que, ao não diferenciar informação importante de informação não importante, acaba, em última instância, por fazer referência à própria noção de conhecimento. Acredito que a teoria apresentada por Foley está no caminho certo; porém, apresenta- se de forma incompleta. Neste artigo, apresento uma interpretação subjetivista de relevância epistêmica, proposta originalmente por Floridi, que complementa a visão proposta por Foley e rechaça as objeções levantadas por Hannon. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento. Informação. Relevância. Abstract: In When is Knowledge True Belief? (2012), Richard Foley offers an original and extraordinarily simple theory of knowledge which intends to overcome its rivals and reorient the theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. Michael Hannon, in his article “Is True Belief Knowledge Plus Adequate Information?” (2013), puts forward an objection to Foley’s view which charges him of offering a circular argument that fails to distinguish important information from unimportant information without ultimately making reference to knowledge. I believe the theory presented by Foley is on the right
Keywords Knowledge  Information  True Belief
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References found in this work BETA

Understanding Epistemic Relevance.Luciano Floridi - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):69-92.
When Is True Belief Knowledge?Diana Karbonowska - 2015 - The European Legacy 20 (3):301-302.

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Similar books and articles

When is True Belief Knowledge?Richard Foley - 2012 - Princeton University Press.
Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology.Richard Foley - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 177--203.
Chapter 25. A Look Back.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 121-123.
Chapter 23. A Priori Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 110-112.
Chapter 8. Knowledge Blocks.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 46-50.
Chapter 24. Collective Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 113-118.
Chapter 3. Knowledge Stories.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 9-11.
Chapter 14. Lucky Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 78-80.
Chapter 21. Introspective Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 102-105.

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