Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651 (2004)
Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed.
Keywords Resemblance Nominalism  Paradigms  Resemblance regress
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DOI 10.1080/713659904
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