Law and Philosophy 41 (1):63-82 (2022)

In this paper, I discuss Goldberg and Zipursky’s Recognizing Wrongs and argue that there is a tension between their philosophy of action as applied to the law of negligence and the idea that the directive-based relationality thesis is central and, therefore, the action and conduct of the defendant should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence.
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DOI 10.1007/s10982-021-09430-w
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.

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Replies to Commentators.John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky - 2022 - Law and Philosophy 41 (1):127-166.

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