Philosophy 93 (4):505-521 (2018)

Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question van Inwagen wanted to answer.
Keywords nothing  something  concrete object
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819118000189
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References found in this work BETA

Grounding is Not a Strict Order.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):517-534.
The Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism.Tom Stoneham - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (6):303 - 325.
Why is There Anything at All?T. J. Mawson - 2009 - In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave-Macmillan.

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