Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology

New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness

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On knowing one's own actions.Lucy F. O'Brien - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation.John Campbell - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Author Profiles

Naomi Eilan
University of Warwick
Johannes Roessler
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Is consciousness embodied.Jesse Prinz - 2008 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 419--437.
Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Perception and Practical Knowledge.John Schwenkler - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.

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