Absolute probability functions for intuitionistic propositional logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):223-234 (1999)
Abstract
Provided here is a characterisation of absolute probability functions for intuitionistic (propositional) logic L, i.e. a set of constraints on the unary functions P from the statements of L to the reals, which insures that (i) if a statement A of L is provable in L, then P(A) = 1 for every P, L's axiomatisation being thus sound in the probabilistic sense, and (ii) if P(A) = 1 for every P, then A is provable in L, L's axiomatisation being thus complete in the probabilistic sense. As there are theorems of classical (propositional) logic that are not intuitionistic ones, there are unary probability functions for intuitionistic logic that are not classical ones. Provided here because of this is a means of singling out the classical probability functions from among the intuitionistic ones
Keywords intuitionistic logic  probability functions  probability semantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004385411641
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,475
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Mathematics of Metamathematics.Helena Rasiowa - 1963 - Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawn. Naukowe.
Probabilistic Semantics Objectified: I. Postulates and Logics.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3):371-394.
Conditionals, Probability, and Non-Triviality.Charles G. Morgan & Edwin D. Mares - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467.
Probabilistic Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic.C. G. Morgan & H. Leblanc - 1983 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (2):161-180.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
31 ( #203,044 of 2,286,052 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #232,410 of 2,286,052 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature