Reasons to Not Believe (and Reasons to Act)

Episteme 13 (4):439-48 (2016)

Authors
Blake Roeber
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
In “Reasons to Believe and Reasons to Act,” Stewart Cohen argues that balance of reasons accounts of rational action get the wrong results when applied to doxastic attitudes, and that there are therefore important differences between reasons to believe and reasons to act. In this paper, I argue that balance of reasons accounts of rational action get the right results when applied to the cases that Cohen considers, and that these results highlight interesting similarities between reasons to believe and reasons to act. I also consider an argument for Cohen's conclusion based on the principle that Adler, Moran, Shah, Velleman and others call “transparency.” I resist this argument by explaining why transparency is itself doubtful.
Keywords rationality, reasons,  suspension of judgment  uniqueness
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2016.23
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References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Adler - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.
A New Argument for Evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

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Citations of this work BETA

Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.

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