The Compatibility of the Structure-and-Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism about Space

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):44-52 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Chalmers (2002) argues against physicalism in part using the premise that no truth about consciousness can be deduced a priori from any set of purely structural truths. Chalmers (2012) elaborates a detailed definition of what it is for a truth to be structural, which turns out to include spatiotemporal truths. But Chalmers (2012) then proposes to define spatiotemporal terms by reference to their role in causing spatial and temporal experiences. Stoljar (2015) and Ebbers (Ms) argue that this definition of spatiotemporal terms allows for the trivial falsification of Chalmers (2002)’s premise about structure and consciousness. I show that this result can be avoided by tweaking the relevant premise, and moreover that this tweak is well-motivated and not ad hoc.

Similar books and articles

A priori entailment and conceptual analysis: Making room for type-c physicalism.J. L. Dowell - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111.
How to Explain the Explanatory Gap.Neil Mehta - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):117-135.
Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
How many explanatory gaps are there?E. Diaz-Leon - 2009 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8 (2):33-35.
Review of David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World.Thomas W. Polger - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (2):419-423.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Conceiving what is not there.Andrew Botterell - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.
Thinking about phenomenal concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2011 - Synthesis Philosophica 26 (2):391-402.
Friedman’s Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility.Milena Ivanova - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):23-37.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-17

Downloads
620 (#26,710)

6 months
84 (#50,114)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luke Roelofs
New York University

Citations of this work

Chalmers v Chalmers.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):469-487.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
Constructing the World.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.

View all 13 references / Add more references