The Compatibility of the Structure‐and‐Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism about Space

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):44-52 (2017)
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Chalmers argues against physicalism using the premise that no truth about consciousness is deducible a priori from purely structural truths, and later defines what it is for a truth to be structural, which turns out to include spatiotemporal truths. But Chalmers then defines spatiotemporal terms by reference to their role in causing spatiotemporal experiences. Stoljar and Ebbers argue that these definitions allow for the trivial falsification of Chalmers premise about structure and consciousness. I show that this result can be avoided by tweaking the relevant premise, and that this tweak is not ad hoc.



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Luke Roelofs
New York University

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Chalmers v Chalmers.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):469-487.

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