In defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism

Utilitas 22 (2):198-221 (2010)
Authors
Jason Rogers
University of Rochester
Abstract
In this paper, I develop, motivate and offer a qualified defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism (SC). I develop the view primarily in light of objections to other versions of SC recently posed by Ben Bradley. I motivate the view by showing that it (1) accommodates the intuitions apparently supporting those objections, (2) is supported by certain ‘common sense’ moral intuitions about specific cases, and (3) captures the central ideas expressed by satisficing consequentialists in the recent literature. Finally, I offer a qualified defense of the view that consists in showing that it meets Bradley’s criteria for being a version of satisficing consequentialism that is ‘worth considering’. Specifically, it is a version of SC that solves certain problems for maximizing consequentialism and yet does not permit the gratuitous prevention of goodness.
Keywords satisficing  consequentialism  maximizing  Bradley  gratuitous prevention of goodness  ethics
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820810000099
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References found in this work BETA

Against Satisficing Consequentialism.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.
Consequences of Consequentialism.David Sosa - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):101-122.
Two Kinds of Satisficing.Thomas Hurka - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):107 - 111.
How Satisficers Get Away with Murder.Tim Mulgan - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):41 – 46.

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Citations of this work BETA

Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion).Chris Tucker - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):127-143.

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