Studia Logica 71 (1):119-132 (2002)

Abstract
In his paper [6], Greg Restall conjectured that a logic supports a naïve comprehension scheme if and only if it is robustly contraction free, that is, if and only if no contracting connective is definable in terms of the primitive connectives of the logic. In this paper, we present infinitely many counterexamples to Restall''s conjecture, in the form of purely implicational logics which are robustly contraction free, but which trivialize naïve comprehension.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Computational Linguistics
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1016391109231
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Logical Consequence and the Paradoxes.Edwin Mares & Francesco Paoli - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):439-469.
Curry’s Paradox and Ω -Inconsistency.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.
Routes to Triviality.Susan Rogerson & Greg Restall - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):421-436.
Natural Deduction and Curry's Paradox.Susan Rogerson - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):155 - 179.

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