Cognitive scientific realism

Philosophy of Science 68 (2):185-202 (2001)

Abstract
Our cognitive capabilities force us into a description of the world by levels. But theories on different levels result in descriptions that differ qualitatively. Therefore, the resulting incommensurability requires ontological bridges between such theories. These are obtained uniquely when the equations of the reduced theory are compared with a suitable limit of the equations of the reducing theory. Four case studies from theoretical physics and astronomy support this claim, two for theories of composites and two for non-composites (field theories). These results a coherent view of a single real world despite its ontological pluralism. The cumulativity of scientific knowledge is thus ensured and realism is supported
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/392872
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,966
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Effective Field Theories, Reductionism and Scientific Explanation.Stephan Hartmann - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32 (2):267-304.
Explanatory Loops and the Limits of Genetic Reductionism.Martin Carrier & Patrick Finzer - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):267 – 283.
The Role of a Posteriori Mathematics in Physics.Edward MacKinnon - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 62:166-175.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms.Pierre Cruse - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
Questions of the Objects of Knowledge and Types of Realism.Władysław Krajewski - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (3):205-213.
What Scientific Theories Could Not Be.Hans Halvorson - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (2):183-206.
Established Theories.Fritz Rohrlich & Larry Hardin - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):603-617.
Realism Despite Cognitive Antireductionism.Fritz Rohrlich - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):73 – 88.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
334 ( #14,778 of 2,236,003 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #986,099 of 2,236,003 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature