Pluralistic ontology and theory reduction in the physical sciences

Abstract
It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent with the unity of nature in the sense of a substantive monism.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/39.3.295
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Local Reduction in Physics.Joshua Rosaler - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 50:54-69.
Effective Field Theories, Reductionism and Scientific Explanation.Stephan Hartmann - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 32 (2):267-304.
Chaos Out of Order: Quantum Mechanics, the Correspondence Principle and Chaos.Gordon Belot & John Earman - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (2):147-182.
The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World.Olimpia Lombardi & Martín Labarca - 2004 - Foundations of Chemistry 7 (2):125-148.

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