Abstract
It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent with the unity of nature in the sense of a substantive monism.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/39.3.295
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Understanding Electromagnetism.Gordon Belot - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):531-555.
The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World.Olimpia Lombardi & Martín Labarca - 2004 - Foundations of Chemistry 7 (2):125-148.
Effective Field Theories, Reductionism and Scientific Explanation.Stephan Hartmann - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32 (2):267-304.
Local Reduction in Physics.Joshua Rosaler - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 50:54-69.
Heuristics and the Generalized Correspondence Principle.Hans Radder - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):195-226.

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