Realism despite cognitive antireductionism

Abstract
Building on previous work, I continue the arguments for scientific realism in the presence of a natural level structure of science. That structure results from a cognitive antireductionism that calls for the retention of mature theories even though they have been "superseded". The level structure is based on "scientific truth" characterized by a theory's validity domain and the confirming empirical data. Reductionism (including fundamentalism) fails cognitively because of qualitative differences in the ontology and semantics of successive theories. This cognitive failure exists in spite of the mathematical success of theory reduction. The claim for scientific realism is strongly based on theory coherence between theories on adjacent levels. Level coherence consists of mathematical relations between levels, as well as of reductive explanations. The latter refers to questions that can be posed (but not answered) on a superseded level, but which can be answered (explained) on the superseding level. In view of the pluralism generated by cognitive antireductionism, theory coherence is claimed to be so compelling that it provides strong epistemic justification for a pluralistic scientific realism.
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DOI 10.1080/02698590412331289260
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References found in this work BETA
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
Explanatory Unification.Philip Kitcher - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.
In Defense of Convergent Realism.Clyde L. Hardin & Alexander Rosenberg - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (4):604-615.
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Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In Praise of Conservative Induction.H. R. Post - 1971 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 2 (3):213-255.

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Citations of this work BETA
Philosophical Issues in Electromagnetism.Mathias Frisch - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):255-270.

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