John Locke ja G. W. Leibniz heikkotahtoisuudesta

Ajatus 55:37-56 (1998)

Authors
Markku Roinila
University of Helsinki
Abstract
This paper discusses the topic of weakenss of the will or akrasia in Leibniz, especially in the context of Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. I argue that Leibniz can be seen as supporting both the weak and the strong forms of akrasia in book II of the work.
Keywords John Locke  G. W. Leibniz  Weakness of will  heikkotahtoisuus
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