Urteilstheorien und Sachverhalte

In Satz Und Sachverhalt. Academia Verlag. pp. 9-72 (2001)
Barry Smith
State University of New York, Buffalo
The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong, and finally, Adolf Reinach’s addition of a linguistic dimension to the Brentano-Husserlian theory of judgment – an account of judgments as ways of doing things with words in what Reinach called ‘social acts’.
Keywords Kasimir Twardowski  Adolf Reinach  judgment  theories of judgment
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