Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths

Philosophia 39 (3):547-561 (2011)
Abstract
That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding to this problem for safety, issuing from work by Williamson and Pritchard, are of dubious success
Keywords epistemology  anti-luck  safety  senstivity  necessary truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9295-0
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology.Peter Baumann - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
Safety and the True–True Problem.Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Safety and Epistemic Luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Becker on Epistemic Luck.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):171-175.
Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
Getting 'Lucky' with Gettier.Ian M. Church - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):37-49.
Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues.Guy Axtell - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 158--177.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-12-03

Total downloads

472 ( #3,366 of 2,132,318 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

53 ( #4,856 of 2,132,318 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums