Philosophia 39 (3):547-561 (2011)

Authors
Jeffrey W. Roland
Louisiana State University
Abstract
That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding to this problem for safety, issuing from work by Williamson and Pritchard, are of dubious success
Keywords epistemology  anti-luck  safety  senstivity  necessary truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9295-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Modal Security.Justin Clarke‐Doane & Dan Baras - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology.Peter Baumann - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
Safety and the True–True Problem.Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.
From Isolation to Skepticism.Scott Hill - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):649-668.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Safety and Epistemic Luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Becker on Epistemic Luck.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):171-175.
Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
Getting 'Lucky' with Gettier.Ian M. Church - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):37-49.
Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues.Guy Axtell - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 158--177.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-12-03

Total views
1,018 ( #3,997 of 2,403,030 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
82 ( #8,100 of 2,403,030 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes